WSI

If most Americans tend to view terrorism thorough the prism of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, many in the European Union are more likely to consider (or rather reconsider) it in light of the Madrid bombings of March 2004 or those that occurred in London in July 2005. Before Madrid or London, the likes of the IRA, ETA, and the Red Brigades shaped European perceptions of the threat posed by terrorists. However, as Sept. 11 was for Americans so, albeit it to a far lesser degree, Madrid and London were for Europeans. They gave notice that it was impossible to ignore that terrorists’ means and ends had changed. Even if, as some have charged, Europe still does not realise the full implications of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Madrid and London bombings did serve as a ‘wake up call’ of sorts as far as international terrorism is concerned.

In responding to the new wave of political violence typified and launched by the Sept. 11 attacks, the EU has tended to emphasize “soft” security options such as disrupting terrorist finances, improving transport and border security, and recalibrating development aid in an attempt to address the underlying causes of terrorism. This is not to say that “harder” options – such as full-blown military actions – have been ruled out. However, as things stand, EU policymakers tend to favour less directly militaristic methods than those embraced by their American counterparts. This is clearly reflected in the range of policies and decisions on the fight against terrorism adopted by the EU since Sept. 2001. This overview will focus primarily on the ‘hard security’ measures, which form only a part of the full EU response to terrorism.

Background

Long before the appearance of Osama bin Laden and his followers and emulators organisations as varied as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (and its affiliates), the Basque ETA, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Red Army Faction bedeviled European policy makers who struggled to come up with viable counter terrorism responses. These policy makers recognised the need for pan-European cooperation and coordination, leading to the establishment in 1975 of the TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence, Internationalism) Group. TREVI served as a forum for internal security cooperation amongst EEC/EC interior and justice ministers in the internal security area, with a special emphasis on the fight against terrorism. Counter-terrorism also appears in a number of European discussions and documents prior to 2001, for example in the Council Conclusions from Madrid (1995), Tampere (1999) and Santa Maria da Feira (2000).

European Initiatives

Without doubt, EU counter-terrorism efforts acquired new urgency after Sept. 11, 2001. Within ten days, the Extraordinary European Council on Sept. 21 adopted the EU Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism ( updated in Dec. 2004). Eighteen months later, in response to the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, the Council adopted the Declaration of the European Council on Combating Terrorism (March 25, 2004). The most recent flagship document guiding EU action on counterterrorism is the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the Council on Dec. 1, 2005.

The documents laid the groundwork for the creation of several new European initiatives and institutions tasked with counterterrorism. Dutch politician Gijs de Vries was appointed as the EU's counter-terrorism co-ordinator shortly after the Madrid bombing. As his work title implies, de Vries' (relatively modest) staff co-ordinates national efforts against terrorism rather than initiating common European action. De Vries played a key role in drafting the Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It defines EU’s priority thusly: to prevent people turning to terrorism, to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack, to pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders and globally, and to manage and minimise the consequences of a terrorist attack. As the definition of priorities implies, most action likely to flow from the strategy would fall under the rubric of law enforcement or developmental aid – as has, indeed, been the case with the many-faceted EU response to date. Nevertheless, the strategy does allow for ‘hard security’ application of EU power.

The Council’s Situation Center (SitCent), for example, has been reinforced in 2004 to take on additional counterterrorism tasks. SitCent provides the Council with risk assessments for EU-led crisis management operations and assessments of WMD proliferation, among other things. Its counter-terrorism role includes providing strategic analysis of the terrorist threat based on intelligence from member states' security and intelligence services.

To date, the EU does not engage ESDP resources for direct military intervention against terrorist activity. The issue remains divisive and will most likely remain in the hands of individual EU member states or coalitions. However, the military capability dimension of the EU’s counterterrorism policy received a legal basis with the Council’s May 23, 2005 endorsement of the Political and Security Committee’s report “Conceptual Framework on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Dimension in the Fight Against Terrorism”. Using diplomatic language to refer to possible use of force, the report specifically states that terrorism “can be addressed only by applying the full spectrum of instruments at the disposal of the European Union and its Member States.” The four scenarios where military force may be used against terrorism are listed as follows: prevention of a looming terrorist attack, using military personnel to protect key civilian targets and the troops themselves, response to attacks, and support to third countries fighting terrorism. Importantly, the Conceptual Framework instructs EU military authorities to include these scenarios in their force planning – i.e. to make counter-terrorism one of the express goals guiding the reform of European military forces.

Some of the European Union’s current missions already closely resemble scenarios listed in the Conceptual Framework. EUJUST LEX – the EU rule of law mission to Iraq – is one such instance of support to a third country. Arguably, regardless of whether the conflict in Iraq is considered to be part of any so-called ‘war on terrorism,’ it has come to affect the counter-terrorism policies of the EU and others. In that regard, EUJUST LEX represents a counter-terrorism initiative of sorts, differentiating it from undertakings such as the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) or the European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA) with their stronger focus on post-conflict resolution and combating organised crime – something they share with other EU police missions.

EU border control missions like the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine EU are readily applicable to counter-terrorism. This is sometimes more true given the geo-strategic significance of some such operations, such as that at the Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah), or EU Support to the Georgian Border Guards (GBG). Meanwhile, other missions, such as the EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR – Althea) have seen the counter-terrorist dimension left to NATO.

Key issues in European Debates

A New Terrorism?
It has been argued that Europeans’ approach differs from that of the Americans due to their different experience of terrorism. Some analysts have noted a preference for political and law enforcement solutions in EU counter-terrorism, contrasting this with the intelligence and military operations-led approach favoured by America. As the U.S. National Commission on Terrorism wrote as far back as 2000: “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it.” While it is debatable if, as such comments imply, al-Qaida and their fellow travelers (against whom any American “war” is arguably being directed rather than terrorism itself) are totally nihilistic or irrational (both qualities that, like terrorism itself, can reside in the eye of the beholder), their brand of political violence is undoubtedly a different animal to that of their European predecessors and counterparts. In that regard, it is perhaps inevitable that the EU, with more experience of more ‘conventional’ terrorism than was embodied in the Sept. 11 attacks, should address this threat differently than America.

These differences are often said to revolve around Washington’s concept of a “war” being waged again terrorism, a notion that was received in Europe with considerable skepticism. However, the differences between U.S. and European can easily be overstated. After all, French, Polish and U.K. Special Forces are pursuing terrorists in Afghanistan alongside U.S. troops.

Nevertheless, some differences are real and rooted in European realities. Europeans are more concerned about the prospect of a terrorist attack within their own borders, something that may be predicated on their proximity to North Africa and the Middle East (where much of the Islamic terrorism so prevalent today originated), and their own sizeable Muslim populations. The ‘radicalisation’ of the later appears to be a genuine – if difficult to quantify – threat. Some 41 percent of Muslim terrorist suspects arrested in Europe between 1993 and 2004 were reportedly Western nationals, with 87 percent hailing from an immigrant background. Those responsible for the London bombings of July 2005 were home-grown terrorists.

It follows that the EU counter-terrorism chiefs must be wary of alienating indigenous Muslim populations with policies that are viewed as anti-Islamic lest they inadvertently build up the recruitment and support base of al-Qaida and others. Such concerns may be further complicated as those European Muslims fighting coalition forces in Iraq return home: Iraq may yet prove the diaspora for those fighting government and foreign forces that Afghanistan was for the mujahedin there, with similar security headaches for the West.

Hard Versus Soft Options
The EU’s alleged tendency towards ‘soft’ over ‘hard’ options was reflected in the 2003 European Security Strategy . Citing the use of large-scale aggression against a member state as “improbable,” this highlighted newer threats which were “more diverse, less visible and less predictable.” These threats – Terrorism; Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Regional Conflicts; State Failure; and Organized Crime – are identified as not being solely military in nature and therefore not addressable by military means alone. Military means are not ruled out. Indeed, it is explicitly acknowledged that they may be required not only in combating terrorism but in restoring order to failed states or in the post conflict-phase of regional violence. However, such assessments notwithstanding, the overall impression of the proposed approach to terrorism is that it favors ‘softer’ security options over more purely military ones.

This impression is also fostered, albeit less implicitly, in the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This comprises four pillars: Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond. Of these, prevention arguably lies at the softer non-military end of the spectrum while response lies at the other and explicitly encompasses “drawing on all available means, including military resources.” The pursuit element outlines the need for the EU to adopt a global approach to its counter-terrorist activities and includes enhancing “the capability of priority third countries,” as a key priority. Such third country capability enhancement is also mentioned in with the 2010 Headline Goals with regard to providing support in combating terrorism, and is perhaps one of the more politically acceptable military counter-terrorism measures, falling as it does between softer preventative options and more hard-line military interventions. Notwithstanding some of the possible interpretations of the “Conceptual Framework on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Dimension in the Fight Against Terrorism”, counter-terrorism remains for Europe largely an exercise in soft power.

Time Line

December 1, 2005: European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the Council
July 7, 2005 - Suicide bombers kill 52 in attack on London transportation system. Three bombs placed on London Tube and one on a bus are later linked to U.K.-born and raised suicide bombers of Middle Eastern and Caribbean origin
March 25, 2004: the Council adopted the Declaration of the European Council on Combating Terrorism
March 11, 2004 - Co-ordinated terrorist bombings against the commuter train system of Madrid, Spain killed 191 people and wounded 1,460
November 28, 2003: Establishment of Evaluation Mechanism of the Legal Systems and their Implementation at national level (Council Decision 2002/996/JHA
March 11, 2003: Establishment of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Commission Communication on “Wider Europe: A New Frame
March 6, 2003: CTC convenes First Special Meeting
June 13, 2002: Establishment of European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between MS (Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA); establishment of Joint investigation teams (Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA); and establishment of common definition of terrorist offences in all MS, common minimum threshold for penalties and sanctions relating to terrorist offences, and common rules on the competence of MS’ jurisdiction. (Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 2002/475/JHA)
April 22, 2002: Adoption of MEDA Action Plan and establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation (5th EU-Med Conference)
February 28, 2002: Establishment of Eurojust (Council Decision 2002/187/JHA) for coordination of investigations and prosecutions of MS (between magistrates and prosecutors), and facilitation of execution of international mutual assistance and extradition requests
February 2002: Commitments to enhanced intercultural dialogue by EU and the organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
December 27, 2001: Adoption of four Acts by Council (Common Position on combating terrorism 2001/930/CFSP; Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism 2001/931/CFSP; Regulation on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons, and entities No 2580/2001
December 4, 2001: Inclusion of terrorist financing in area of money laundering (Council Directive 1991/308/EEC (June 10, 1991) Council Directive 2001/97/EC (Dec. 4, 2001)
September 28, 2001: Adoption by Security Council of UN Resolution 1373 affirming the UN’s central role in the global fight against terrorism with the establishment of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)
September 21, 2001: Adoption of EU Action Plan to Combat Terrorism (Extraordinary European Council Conclusions)
November 27, 2000: Amendment of MEDA (Council Regulation No 2698/2000)
February 25, 2000: Ratification by all EU MS of UN Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
December 3, 1998: Establishment of Europol’s Counter Terrorism Unit for information exchange between MS (Europol Convention )
July 23, 1996: Establishment of MEDA, EMP’s financial instrument (Council Regulation No 1488/96)
Nov. 27, 1995: Establishment of EU-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or “Barcelona Process”, including adoption of Declaration and Work Program (first EU-Mediterranean Conference)
1975: Terrorism first raised by TREVI Group (European Council Conclusions in Madrid (1995), Tampere (1999) and Santa Maria da Feira (2000)

Sources for further reading